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Abstract
This paper surveys 27 account guarantee (AG) programs across 14 Key Design Decisions.
The main themes that emerge are: (a) the importance of considering the effects of AG
programs on other parts of the financial system or other jurisdictions, (b) the ability to
address moral hazard through heightened supervision, which removes a potential obstacle
to adopting AG programs in response to the acute phase of crises, (c) the necessity of
developing guarantees that are credible and timely, and (d) the need to design standing AG
programs with an eye toward how they will function during crises.
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Introductory Note: This survey is an analysis of important considerations for policymakers
seeking to establish an account guarantee (AG) program. It is based on insights derived from
case studies of 27 specific AG programs the Yale Program on Financial Stability has
completed and from the existing literature on the topic. While this survey can help inform a
decision about whether or not to establish an AG program, our main purpose is to assist
policymakers who have already made that decision in designing the most effective program
possible. In analyzing the programs that are the focus of this survey, we used a color-coded
system to highlight certain particularly noteworthy design features.
Treatment
BLUE – INTERESTING

Meaning
A design feature that is interesting and that
policymakers may want to consider. Typically,
this determination is based on the observation
that the design feature involves a unique and
potentially promising way of addressing a
challenge common to this type of program that
may not be obvious. Less commonly, empirical
evidence or a consensus will indicate that the
design feature was effective in this context, in
which case we will describe that evidence or
consensus.
A design feature that policymakers should
exercise caution in considering. Typically, this
determination is based on the observation that
the designers of the feature later made
significant changes to the feature with the
intention of improving the program. Less
commonly, empirical evidence or a consensus
will indicate that the design feature was
ineffective in this context, in which case we will
describe that evidence or consensus.

YELLOW – CAUTION INDICATED

FOOTNOTE IN ITALICS

Where the reason that a given design feature
has been highlighted is not apparent from the
text, it is accompanied by an italicized footnote
that explains why we chose to highlight it.
Where necessary, these footnotes will be used
to identify any considerations that should be
kept in mind when thinking about the feature.

This highlighting is not intended to be dispositive. The fact that a design feature is not
highlighted or is highlighted yellow does not mean that it should not be considered or that it
will never be effective under any circumstances. Similarly, the fact that a design feature is
not highlighted or is highlighted blue does not mean that it should always be considered or
will be effective under all circumstances. The highlighting is our subjective attempt to guide
readers toward certain design features that (1) may not be obvious but are worth
considering or (2) require caution.
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Introduction
Bank runs have accelerated financial crises throughout history. Widespread withdrawals
from accounts that enable depositors to access their funds on demand can have a
destabilizing effect on institutions lacking the liquid assets to meet those withdrawal
requests. Governments have a long record of responding to runs with ad hoc measures to
support banks, often protecting depositors and other stakeholders in the process. But until
the 1960s, only the United States had a formal, standing guarantee to depositors that they
would receive their funds back even in the event of an institution’s failure. Historians
attribute the early US adoption of explicit deposit insurance to the country’s unusual reliance
on small banks and its history of periodic banking panics (Anginer, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Zhu
2014; Calomiris and Jaremski 2016). As bank failures became more common in the 1970s
and 1980s, other countries increasingly adopted explicit national deposit insurance systems
to replace the implicit insurance implied by ad hoc rescues. The move toward explicit
insurance accelerated as the European Union (EU), International Monetary Fund (IMF), and
World Bank (WB) promoted the practice in the 1990s. But adoption in any given country
was most likely during or after a banking crisis (Demirgüç-Kunt, Kane, and Laeven 2008).
This paper surveys 27 account guarantee (AG) programs adopted during the Global Financial
Crisis (GFC). Each case represents an effort to eliminate depositors’ incentive to remove
funds from accounts by guaranteeing that those accounts will be paid out even if the
institution that holds them is unable to do so. Figure 1 lists the 27 programs. The cases
include both the adoption of new, formal deposit insurance programs during crises and the
expansion of existing, similar programs. The latter always involved a significant increase in
coverage limits, whether to a new, higher limit or by becoming unlimited. Often these
increases were accompanied by other changes, such as the elimination of co-insurance, the
expansion of institutional and account eligibility, and the speeding up of payouts. Not
included among these cases are any programs in which accounts were guaranteed as part of
a blanket guarantee on all or nearly all liabilities of the banking system (as was the case, for
example, in Ireland). These blanket guarantee programs have unique considerations and will
be surveyed in a future paper.
The main body of the paper analyzes 14 Key Design Decisions. Wherever possible, we
explore why policymakers responded the way they did. The paper seeks to distill important
considerations for policymakers when establishing AG programs. Among the themes that
emerge are (a) the importance of considering the effects of AG programs on other parts of
the financial system and other jurisdictions; (b) the ability to address moral hazard through
heightened supervision, removing a potential obstacle to adopting AG programs in response
to the acute phase of crises; (c) the necessity of developing guarantees that are credible and
timely; and (d) the need to design standing AG programs with an eye toward how they will
function during crises.
This survey contributes to an extensive literature on deposit guarantees. This literature has
long shown that deposit insurance protects deposits and helps prevent bank runs. It has also
highlighted the potential moral hazard concerns of guaranteeing bank deposits. In this view,
the removal of the threat of loss erodes market discipline by causing depositors to abandon
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their scrutiny of banks, which can encourage bank managers to take greater risks (Anginer
and Demirgüç-Kunt 2018). A review of 96 countries between 2004 and 2009 showed strong
evidence of both effects (Anginer, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Zhu 2014). Countries that had
established generous deposit insurance schemes by 2003 experienced greater bank risk and
systemic fragility in the run-up to the GFC, but then performed better once the crisis began.
However, this study did not consider the effects of account guarantees that countries
introduced or strengthened during the crisis.
To frame our discussion of crisis-era AG programs, it is helpful to think of financial crises and
policy responses as having two phases: acute and chronic. In the initial acute phase, the
financial system has an obvious liquidity problem—runs on banks are easy to spot—but the
underlying solvency of the financial system is difficult to judge. During this acute phase,
policy responses need to be fast and emphasize direct liquidity support, either in the form of
emergency lending or liability guarantees. To achieve these goals, policy should be targeted
to influence the behavior of depositors and other suppliers of short-term credit to banks,
rather than to the banks themselves.
In the later, chronic phase, the immediate liquidity pressures have eased but any underlying
solvency problems remain. In the traditional banking sector, a chronic phase would be
characterized by low capital levels at banks and balance-sheet pressure that hold back longterm lending. A chronically weak banking sector is a drag on economic growth, and is a main
reason that downturns are deeper and recoveries take longer in recessions that follow
financial crises (Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor 2013). During the chronic phase, policy should
be targeted to influence the behavior of the banks themselves.
We believe that moral-hazard concerns should be given different weight in the acute and
chronic phases. In the acute phase—where most of the programs studied here were
introduced—the focus needs to be on the immediate behavior of depositors. With
uncertainty about bank solvency, it would not be rational for depositors to do any deep
analysis of their banks. The simplest response to solvency concerns is to withdraw one’s
deposits, since withdrawal has only a nuisance cost but potentially a large benefit. Though
depositor runs may provide a check on moral hazard, reliance on depositor runs as a form
of market discipline is not an efficient means for addressing moral hazard and could be
disastrous during the acute phase of a crisis.
In a chronic phase, moral-hazard concerns should play a larger role. Here, policymakers are
looking to influence bank behavior directly, with incentives for banks to do more lending and
make changes to their risk profiles. AG programs in the chronic phase can induce banks to
make riskier loans and can distort the competitive landscape among banks and other
nonbank institutions. That said, scaling back AG programs prematurely during the chronic
phase of a crisis could reaggravate liquidity pressures. As will be discussed and is
demonstrated by many of the AG programs studied, heightened supervision of the
institutions covered by expanded guarantees can guard against the moral-hazard concerns
that arise during the chronic phase of crises.
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Figure 1: Programs Covered in This Survey

AUS
AUT

Date of
announcement
10/12/2008
10/8/2008

Unlimited; AUD 1 million
Unlimited

BEL

10/10/2008

EUR 100,000

BRZ

3/26/2009

FRA

9/29/2010

EUR 100,000

Vergara 2022b

GRC

10/8/2008

EUR 100,000

Engbith 2022a

HKG

10/14/2008

Unlimited

HUN

10/8/2008

ICE

10/6/2008

Unlimited

Kulam 2022b

IDN

10/13/2008

IDR 2 billion

Engbith 2022b

KWT
LVA

10/26/2008
10/16/2008

Unlimited
EUR 50,000; EUR 100,000

Nunn 2022c
Vergara 2022c

LUX

10/17/2008

EUR 100,000

Vergara 2022d

MYS

10/16/2008

Unlimited

Vergara 2022e

NZL

10/12/2008

PHL

10/9/2008

PHP 500,000

Engbith 2022c

PRT

11/3/2008

EUR 100,000

Nygaard 2022

ROM

10/12/2008

EUR 50,000; EUR 100,000

Vergara 2022g

RUS

10/13/2008

RUB 700,000

Vergara 2022h

SGP

10/16/2008

Unlimited

Vergara 2022i

Slovenia: Unlimited Deposit Guarantee

SVN

10/8/2008

Unlimited

Vergara 2022j

Spain: Deposit Guarantee Funds
Swiss Banks' and Securities Dealers'
Depositor Protection Association
Taiwan (ROC): Central Deposit
Insurance Corporation
United Kingdom: Financial Services
Compensation Scheme
United States: Temporary Guarantee
Program for Money Market Funds
United States: Transaction Account
Guarantee Program

SPA

10/10/2008

EUR 100,000

Vergara 2022k

SWI

11/5/2008

CHF 100,000

Vergara 2022l

TWN

10/7/2008

TWD 3 million; unlimited

Engbith 2022d

UK

10/3/2008

USA - TGMMF

9/19/2008

Unlimited

Vergara 2022n

USA - TAGP

10/14/2008

Unlimited

Vergara 2022o

Case Title
Australia: Financial Claims Scheme
Austria: Unlimited Deposit Guarantee
Belgium: Protection Fund/Special
Protection Fund
Brazil: Time Deposits with Special
Guarantee
France: Deposit Guarantee Fund
Greece: Hellenic Deposit Guarantee
Fund
Hong Kong SAR: Full Deposit
Guarantee
Hungary: National Deposit Insurance
Fund
Iceland: Depositors' and Investors'
Guarantee Fund
Indonesia Deposit Insurance
Corporation
Kuwait: Unlimited Deposit Guarantee
Latvia: Deposit Guarantee Fund
Association for the Guarantee of
Deposits Luxembourg
Malaysia: Government Deposit
Guarantee
New Zealand: Crown Retail Deposit
Guarantee Scheme
Philippine Deposit Insurance
Corporation
Portugal: Deposit Guarantee Fund
Romania: Bank Deposit Guarantee
Fund
Russia: Deposit Insurance Agency
(2008 - 2009)
Singapore: Government Guarantee on
Deposits

Country Code

Crisis level(s)

Reference
Vergara 2022a
Nunn 2022a
Kulam 2022a

BRL 20 million (time deposits) Nunn 2022b

Vergara and Engbith
2022

Unlimited; HUF 13 million; EUR
Lei and Vergara 2022
50,000; EUR 100,000

Unlimited; NZD 1 million; NZD
500,000 for banks and NZD Vergara 2022f
250,000 for non-banks

GBP 35,000, then GBP 50,000 Vergara 2022m

Sources: Engbith 2022a; Engbith 2022b; Engbith 2022c; Engbith 2022d; Kulam 2022a; Kulam 2022b; Lei and
Vergara 2022; Nunn 2022a; Nunn 2022b; Nunn 2022c; Nygaard 2022; Vergara 2022a; Vergara 2022b; Vergara
and Engbith 2022; Vergara 2022c; Vergara 2022d; Vergara 2022e; Vergara 2022f; Vergara 2022g; Vergara
2022h; Vergara 2022i; Vergara 2022j; Vergara 2022k; Vergara 2022l; Vergara 2022m; Vergara 2022n; Vergara
2022o
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Key Design Decisions
1. Purpose: What were the specific motivations for introducing the AG program?
Despite each involving a similar desire to protect funds held in guaranteed accounts, usually
with the stated objective of promoting liquidity for banks or the financial system broadly,
the AG programs studied had a variety of motivations that provided the impetus for
establishing a guarantee. Based on our analysis of the programs, we have identified four key
motivations:
•

Actual Run: Widespread withdrawals cause policymakers to adopt an AG program
to halt or reverse those withdrawals.

•

Concerns about Confidence: The fear that account holders may be losing
confidence causes policymakers to adopt an AG program in a preemptive fashion to
prevent a run.

•

Competitive Pressures: The introduction of AG programs in other jurisdictions or
other sectors of the domestic financial system causes policymakers to adopt an AG
program to prevent the institutions and accounts covered from being at a
competitive disadvantage.

•

Supranational Requirements: The adoption of guidelines by supranational
bodies, such as the EU, causes a need for policymakers to adopt an AG program to
satisfy the guidelines.

As indicated in Figure 2, these motivations are not mutually exclusive, and programs often
had more than a single motivation. All targeted the account holders and sought to influence
their behavior.
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Figure 2: Motivations by AG Program

Country

Responding
to actual run

Responding
to bolster
depositor
confidence

Responding
to
competitive
pressures

Responding
to specific
guidelines or
requirements

✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
-

✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
-

✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
-

AUS
AUT
BEL
BRZ
FRA
GRC
HKG
HUN
ICE
IDN
KWT
LUX
LVA
MYS
NZL
PHL
PRT
ROM
RUS
SGP
SPA
SVN
SWI
TWN
UK
USA - TAGP
USA - TGMMF
Source: Authors’ analysis.

For those programs introduced in response to an actual run, it is interesting to note who was
running and to where. In Brazil, for instance, before the adoption of the Time Deposits with
Special Guarantee (DPGE), depositors fled from small- and medium-sized banks to larger
banks, with the apparent belief that the government was more likely to backstop the latter
(Banco Central do Brasil 2009; Mesquita and Torós 2010). The opposite pattern prevailed in
Switzerland during the GFC, perhaps based on the perception that the largest Swiss banks
were too big relative to the size of the economy to be effectively rescued (IMF 2009a). In
Taiwan, the government’s seizure of a systemically important financial institution resulted
in depositor runs from private banks to state-owned institutions (Marks and Yao 2008).
In some instances, the direction of an actual or feared run resulted in an AG program
designed to assist the institutions at risk. Given the withdrawals from small- and mediumsized banks in Brazil, policymakers targeted the DPGE at a specific type of account—time
deposits—on which such institutions were heavily reliant. Taiwan’s Central Deposit
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Insurance Corporation (CDIC) sought to shore up private banks by covering them with the
unlimited guarantee that depositors may have believed that state-owned institutions
implicitly possessed.
2. Part of a Package: Was the AG program intended to work on its own or was it
introduced alongside, or otherwise seen as operating in tandem with, other policy
interventions?
One of the earliest decisions confronted in designing an AG program is whether the program
will operate alone or in combination with other policy interventions. The specific
motivations underlying a particular AG program may influence this decision. For example,
policymakers responding to, or anticipating, depositor runs typically take other measures to
promote bank liquidity. They may fear that other liability-holders will lose confidence.
During the GFC, many countries paired account guarantee and bank debt guarantee
programs, such as the US with its two-pronged Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program
(TLGP).
Emergency lending programs, meanwhile, can replace lost liquidity. Such liquidity-focused
interventions will be insufficient, however, when financial institutions’ capital has eroded.
For these institutions, injections of capital become necessary. Recapitalization programs are
for this reason another recurrent component of packages involving AG programs. Early
during the GFC, several countries acted quickly to recapitalize large, struggling financial
institutions—such as UBS in Switzerland and Dexia in Belgium, France, and Luxembourg —
while using account guarantees to reassure depositors in smaller institutions that their
deposits were also safe.
Figure 3 shows which types of interventions policymakers combined with AG programs.
Many of these combinations were not as obvious as the pairing of the Debt Guarantee
Program and Transaction Account Guarantee Program (TAGP) under the TLGP umbrella.
The determinations reflected in Figure 3 are based on the existence of some evidence
indicating that policymakers thought of the AG program in question as operating in tandem
with these other interventions.
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Figure 3: Other Key Interventions Combined With AG Programs

Country

Existence of
broad-based
recapitalization

AUS
AUT
BEL
BRZ
FRA
GRC
HKG
HUN
ICE
IDN
KWT
LUX
LVA
MYS
NZL
PHL
PRT
ROM
RUS
SGP
SPA
SVN
SWI
TWN
UK
USA - TAGP
USA - TGMMF
Source: Authors’ analysis.

✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓

Existence of
broad-based
emergency
lending
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓

Existence of
bank debt
guarantees
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓

Specific AG programs can also be thought of as forming part of a package with similar AG
programs in related jurisdictions. The possibility of runs from non-guaranteed to guaranteed
accounts (or, often more precisely, from accounts guaranteed up to one amount to accounts
guaranteed up to a higher amount) creates incentives for jurisdictions with close financial
ties to harmonize their approaches to AG programs. Policymakers in Malaysia and Singapore
coordinated on the rollout of AG programs in response to Hong Kong’s introduction of a full
deposit guarantee. All three countries would later form the Tripartite Working Group to
synchronize the joint termination of their programs to avoid any runs from one jurisdiction
to another (IADI 2012). The EU likewise sought to coordinate member states’ AG programs
through the guidelines and directives discussed in more detail elsewhere in this paper.
Unilateral action by individual member states could complicate these efforts, as when
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announcements of unlimited guarantees by Germany, Austria, and Greece appeared to
deepen rifts within the EU on crisis response (IMF 2009c).6
3. Legal Authority: What legal basis did policymakers rely on in establishing the AG
program? Was there a need for new legislation or could they rely on existing
authority?
In thinking about the legal bases relied on by policymakers in establishing AG programs and
whether new legislation was required to do so, it is worth recalling that some of the
programs studied were entirely new creations, while others were expansions of existing
guarantees. While this distinction is not dispositive—there were newly created programs
established under existing authority and expanded programs that required new
legislation—as a general matter the initial establishment of a program may present more
challenges than the expansion of an existing one, depending on the specific legal context.
Figure 4 divides the AG programs into those requiring a new act by a legislative body and
those that relied on existing legal authority. Included in this latter category are programs
created pursuant to an executive or other emergency decree. Some countries, like Indonesia,
created or revised existing programs through executive decrees that the legislature later
incorporated into law. A government could also rely on its existing legal authority if, for
example, its laws already authorized the existing deposit insurance agency (Taiwan) or bank
regulator (UK) to raise the insurance cap without legislative review. Whether or not a
particular AG program required legislative approval is an important distinction, because
securing such approval can (but does not necessarily) make it more difficult and timeconsuming to launch a program. The Philippines is a cautionary tale on this front. Legislative
wrangling resulted in a six-month delay between the announcement of an increase in its
deposit insurance coverage and its actual authorization.

Greece’s initial announcement of an unlimited guarantee was ultimately followed by an adopted increase to EUR
100,000.
6
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Figure 4: AG Programs Requiring New Legislation

Political
guarantee

Legal
guarantee

AUS
AUT
BEL

-

✓
✓

-

✓

BRZ
FRA
GRC
HKG
HUN

✓
✓
-

✓
✓
✓
✓

✓

✓

ICE
IDN
KWT
LUX
LVA
MYS

✓
-

✓
✓
✓
✓
✓

-

✓

-

✓

-

✓
✓

-

✓

Country Code

NZL
PHL
PRT
ROM

RUS
✓
SGP
✓
SPA
✓
SVN
✓
SWI
✓
TWN
✓
✓
UK
✓
USA - TAGP
✓
USA - TGMMF
✓
*Negative values indicate that the program

Required additional Conducted with
Days elapsed*
parliamentary or unilateral or vested
between
congressional
institutional
announcement
approval
authority
and operation

✓
47
✓
-7
✓ (permanent
✓ (temporary
increase)
increase)
-3
✓
0
✓
0
✓
31
✓
0
✓ (for limited
✓ (for unlimited
guarantee)
guarantee)
7
✓
0
✓
0
✓
8
✓
76
✓
2
✓ (retroactive
unknown
establishment)
0
✓ (for extensions and ✓ (for establishment)
alterations)
0
✓
235
✓
unknown
✓ (retroactive
✓
establishment)
3
✓
0
✓
0
✓
0
✓
34
✓
45
✓
0
✓
4
✓
0
✓
10
took retroactve effect prior to the date of announcement.

Source: Authors’ analysis.

As noted in Figure 4, even some AG programs that were newly created did not require
legislative approval. The TGMMF in the US made creative (and somewhat controversial) use
of an existing fund for stabilizing exchange rates to establish a new guarantee for money
market funds (MMFs). And in Hong Kong, although the program was not entirely new, the
unlimited guarantee implemented on top of the existing deposit insurance system relied on
a similar exchange stabilization fund. Such novel uses of existing authority may allow for the
more rapid implementation of programs, but they are not without risk. In response to the
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TGMMF, the US Congress prohibited the future use of exchange stabilization funds for such
guarantees.7 Hong Kong appears not to have faced a similar backlash.
Systemic risk exceptions were another avenue for introducing AG programs without further
legislative authorization. Policymakers could engage in activities they were otherwise
prohibited from undertaking upon making a determination that such activities were
necessary to address a threat to the stability of the financial system. Given the extraordinary
nature of such exceptions, often these determinations would be subject to safeguards—for
example, requiring the approval of multiple agencies by a supermajority vote of their boards.
The US (TAGP), Taiwan, and Indonesia each made use of systemic risk exceptions in
establishing AG programs.
In some cases, policymakers moved forward despite unclear legal authority. Malaysian
policymakers introduced the GDG in 2008 without an explicit legal basis. In 2010, Malaysia’s
Parliament passed a law that retroactively provided this explicit legal basis, noting that
everything the government had done “in anticipation of the enactment of this Act shall be
deemed to have been validly and lawfully done” (Parliament of Malaysia 2010). The law also
authorized the finance minister in a future crisis to expand deposit insurance again on a
temporary basis without further legislative approval, under consultation with the central
bank and the deposit insurance agency.
Guarantees based on a government’s announced intention to stand behind its deposits
(usually on an unlimited basis) are sometimes referred to as “political guarantees” and
present a unique situation from a legal perspective. When such intentions are not transposed
into law (as was the case for Germany’s unlimited guarantee during the GFC), they may have
unclear legal status.
In Europe, member states had to consider not only their own national legal requirements,
but also the guidelines and directives of the EU. All member states complied with guidance
issued by the EU’s Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN), calling for the
implementation of national deposit insurance coverage levels at a minimum of EUR 50,000,
although that guidance was non-binding. All member states likewise complied with the
binding directive of the European Parliament and of the Council in March 2009, which
established a EUR 50,000 minimum coverage level until December 31, 2010, at which time
the minimum would increase to EUR 100,000.
4. Administration: Who was responsible for the day-to-day activities of the AG
program?
A key question in designing an AG program is who will administer it. The first decision is
whether to create a separate corporation or to give the responsibility to the central bank (as
in Hong Kong and Singapore), bank regulator (Australia), or treasury (New Zealand). In our
survey, even programs that expanded on existing guarantees sometimes used new
approaches to administration. In Belgium, for example, the FDP administered the country’s
Congress temporarily restored the ability to use the ESF for money market fund guarantees during the COVID19 pandemic.
7
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existing deposit insurance system before the GFC, providing coverage of up to EUR 20,000
(later increased to EUR 50,000). With the onset of the crisis, Belgium created a second
government entity called the SPF to administer the guarantee of balances from EUR 50,000
to EUR 100,000. The two entities administered the expanded Belgian guarantee in this twotiered system notwithstanding the fact that each appears to have operated similarly across
key dimensions.
Figure 5 shows the entity responsible for administering each of the AG programs. The
approaches included an existing deposit insurer, a newly created deposit insurer, and some
other entity such as a central bank. An important consideration is the other financial stability
roles of the responsible entity. For example, an AG administrator that is also responsible for
bank supervision may have access to information that helps it administer the guarantee.
Where an AG program is administered by an entity also responsible for resolution, there may
be concerns about adequate funding (Arnaboldi 2014). For example, the IMF criticized Spain
for the amount of funding that could be drawn from the FGD for resolutions (IMF-MCMD
2017).
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Figure 5: AG Program Administration
Administrator(s)

Administrators' overlapping roles within
financial safety net

Ownership of
Administrator(s)

New
Existing
Lender Macroprudential
Other
Resolution
deposit deposit
of last
supervisor or
Private
Public
entity*
authority
insurer
insurer
resort
regulator
AUS
✓
FR
✓
✓
✓
AUT
✓
✓
✓
BEL
✓
✓
✓
BRZ
✓
✓
✓
FRA
✓
✓
GRC
✓
✓
HKG
✓
CB
✓
✓
✓
✓
HUN
✓
✓
✓
ICE
✓
✓
IDN
✓
✓
KWT
CB
✓
✓
✓
LUX
✓
✓
LVA
✓
FR
✓
✓
✓
MYS
✓
NZL
✓
T
✓
✓
PHL
✓
TPC
✓
✓
PRT
✓
CB
✓
✓
ROM
✓
✓
RUS
✓
✓
SGP
CB
✓
✓
✓
✓
SPA
✓
✓
✓
✓
SVN
✓
CB
✓
✓
✓
✓
SWI
✓
✓
TWN
✓
FR
✓
UK
✓
✓
USA - TAGP
✓
✓
✓
✓
USA - TGMMF
T
✓
*Key: CB = Central Bank , FR = Financial Regulator, T = Treasury, TPC = Third-party Corporation
Country

Source: Authors’ analysis.

Corporations established to run deposit insurance programs were typically government
owned. However, 11 of our cases included privately owned corporations. Austria’s system,
for example, involved five private entities representing different sectors of the banking
system (commercial banks, savings banks, two groups of credit cooperatives, and mortgage
banks). The IMF criticized this approach, arguing that it lacked transparency and increased
the risk of inadequate funding (IMF 2014). An important consideration for privately
administered programs is how public oversight will be maintained, which is discussed in Key
Design Decision No. 5, Governance.
5. Governance: Who was responsible for the oversight of the AG program? Were
there any disclosure requirements?
After determining who will be responsible for the day-to-day activities of an AG program,
policymakers must then decide how those activities will be overseen. As many of the
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insurance schemes in our survey were separate government agencies or corporations, they
had boards providing oversight. Australia’s bank regulator, Singapore’s central bank, and
New Zealand’s Treasury oversaw their respective deposit schemes directly, without board
oversight. An unusual case was Hong Kong’s Deposit Protection Scheme (DPS), which the
central bank ran under the oversight of a separate statutory board.
The composition of boards is an important consideration. They typically included
government appointees from the finance ministry, central bank, and bank regulator. Many
had independent members who had no connection to the government. For example, the UK’s
Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS), an independent non-profit organization,
had eight non-executive members with broad experience in banking, finance, and
accounting; and two executive members: the organization’s chief executive and director of
claims. At least 13 AG program boards also included representatives from the banks
themselves, for the purpose of promoting industry input into the oversight. Such
arrangements can be controversial, however. In Romania, for example, the IMF pushed for
the FGDB to remove credit institution officials from its board (IMF 2010c). The IMF also
criticized Switzerland’s ESI for its lack of independent board members (IMF-MCMD 2014).
Required disclosures can be another important avenue for effective oversight. Many of the
AG programs were mandated to issue regular reports on their activities and submit to
periodic audits. The absence of these measures or the failure to make the results public could
trigger concerns about a lack of transparency. Austria, for example, faced criticism from the
IMF about a lack of publicly available information (IMF 2014).
For those AG programs that were privately owned, mechanisms for ensuring public control
were particularly important. In Austria, the country’s central financial regulator, the FMA,
oversaw the activities of the country’s five private deposit insurers. The country’s national
banking law required these private insurers to provide the FMA and Austria’s central bank
with annual financial statements (although as noted, the failure to make these statements
public resulted in criticism from the IMF). Switzerland’s private ESI was subject to oversight
by Swiss financial regulators. The law required regulators to approve its articles of
association and regulations. Swiss law also explicitly provided that the legislature could
further regulate deposit insurance if the ESI’s performance was unsatisfactory.
6. Communication: How did policymakers describe the need for and objectives of the
AG program? Were there any special communication issues?
Communication is of particular importance for AG programs. More so than for perhaps any
other type of crisis intervention, broad public awareness and understanding of AG programs
are essential to their success. AG programs cannot instill confidence if depositors do not
know they exist. At the same time, because of the stigma that can be associated with crisis
interventions, AG administrators need to communicate in a manner that does not erode the
very confidence that the programs are intended to safeguard.
As noted in Key Design Decision No. 1, Purpose, the AG programs had a variety of underlying
motivations. A key consideration from a communication perspective was how policymakers
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described those motivations to the public. Particularly for those AG programs adopted in
response to competitive pressures or supranational requirements rather than actual runs or
concerns about domestic banks, authorities were typically quick to highlight the continued
soundness of their banking systems. Some countries also cited the continued soundness of
their banking systems as a reason for not adopting AG programs, only to reverse themselves
and announce such programs a short time later. Iceland (reversed after one day) and Kuwait
(reversed after one week) each followed this pattern, and the abrupt about-faces may have
contributed to the program announcements being destabilizing. Iceland’s announcement
was greeted with large-scale bank withdrawals, while Kuwaiti bank shares fell following its
announcement (Jónsson and Sigurgeirsson 2016; Irish Times 2008; Noueihed 2008).8
Despite the importance of effective communication, some programs appear to have
experienced difficulties on this front. In Switzerland, survey data suggested that only 25% of
households knew about the ESI (Brown, Guin, and Morkoetter 2020). UK policymakers
conceded that public awareness of the FSCS was low during the GFC, with its independent
investigator also criticizing a lack of clarity in communications with depositors about
ongoing claims and claims decisions (FSCS 2009). The Financial Stability Board (FSB) noted
that lack of public awareness about deposit insurance contributed to the run on Northern
Rock, a large UK mortgage bank. Conversely, the FSB praised the communication efforts of
Canada, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Russia, Singapore, the UK, and the US
(FSB 2012). The IADI praised Hong Kong for making use of television, newspapers, radio,
and the Internet, and for including answers to questions about the program’s
implementation and effects on specific accounts (IADI 2012; HKMA 2009). For temporary
AG programs, problems may arise if communication isn’t as good at the end of the program
as it was at the beginning. In New Zealand, a 2014 survey found that 75% of respondents
believed their deposits were still guaranteed, although the relevant program had expired in
2011 (Adema, Hainz, and Rhode 2019). Interestingly, New Zealand is also an example of the
importance of effective communication between countries. After misunderstanding the
nature of Australia’s AG program, New Zealand extended its own AG program’s coverage to
include a class of nonbank financial institutions not subject to the same regulatory and
supervisory framework as banks. Nine of these nonbank financial institutions failed and
required payouts.
7. Size of Guarantee: How much did the AG program guarantee? Did this amount
change over time?
A fundamental question in designing an AG program is how much that program will
guarantee. The International Association of Deposit Insurers (IADI) recommends that
coverage should be limited, credible, and cover the large majority of depositors, while
leaving a substantial amount of deposits exposed to market discipline (IADI 2014). However,

The problems in Iceland’s banking sector were so severe that destabilization was inevitable even without abrupt
reversals in policy. Still, the sudden about-face may have contributed to the speed with which that destabilization
occurred.
8
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the IADI noted in its 2016 handbook that increasing guarantees during crises may be
“justifiable” (IADI 2016).
As indicated in Figure 6, the AG programs include both programs that guaranteed accounts
up to a specific amount and those that guaranteed unlimited amounts. The practical
implications of guaranteeing a specific versus unlimited amount can vary depending on the
distribution of a jurisdiction’s depositors in terms of account size. If a majority of a system’s
deposits are held in smaller accounts, the difference between a specific coverage limit and
an unlimited guarantee may be relatively modest from the perspective of the total deposits
guaranteed. That said, where a jurisdiction’s depositors have access to additional funds that
can be deposited in response to an increase in guarantee coverage, there is evidence that
they do so. In Belgium, for example, researchers noted a “bunching” of accounts near the preGFC EUR 20,000 limit that then became a bunching near the EUR 100,000 limit once it was
increased (Atmaca et al. 2020). Austria’s unlimited guarantee resulted in an increase in
deposits in all account brackets above the prior EUR 20,000 limit, with a particularly large
surge evident among the largest accounts (Andreasch, Fessler, and Schürz 2012).

56

Journal of Financial Crises

Vol. 4 Iss. 2

Figure 6: AG Program Coverage Limits

Country
AUS
AUT
BEL
BRZ

Conversion to USD* at time of guarantee
Crisis
Pre-crisis
Post-crisis/permanent
†
level
level
level(s)
0
unlimited;
179,546
later 718,184
21,295
unlimited
106,474
21,295
106,474
106,474
14,568
4,162,331
52,029

FRA
GRC
HKG
HUN

74,532
21,295
12,743
14,763

ICE
IDN
KWT
LUX
LVA

22,239
6,880
0
21,295
21,295

106,474
106,474
unlimited
unlimited;
later 34,894 to
106,474

106,474
106,474
63,715
106,474

unlimited
unlimited
137,608
137,608
unlimited
unlimited
106,474
106,474
53,237;
106,474
later 106,474
MYS
13,690
unlimited
57,041
NZL
0
unlimited;
0
later 648,508;
then 324,254
for banks and
162,127 for
non-banks
PHL
4,763
9,526
9,526
PRT
26,618
106,474
106,474
ROM
21,295
53,237;
106,474
later 106,474
RUS
6,336
11,088
11,088
SGP
14,550
unlimited
36,374
SPA
21,295
106,474
106,474
SVN
23,424
unlimited
106,474
SWI
31,162
103,875
103,875
TWN
51,365
102,729;
102,729
later unlimited
UK
39,585
43,706;
106,144
later 62,438
USA - TAGP
unlimited
USA - TGMMF
unlimited
*Exchange rates obtained from Bloomberg. †Successive guarantees are
separated by semicolons.

Source: Authors’ analysis.
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In addition to changes to overall coverage limits, two other features of several AG programs
that influenced the amount of deposits guaranteed were the elimination of co-insurance and
the elimination of netting. Co-insurance refers to an approach in which a guarantee covers
only a specified percentage of deposits under the cap, with depositors responsible for the
remainder. Netting involves reducing a deposit insurance payout by the amount of any
liabilities owed by the depositor to the failed bank. As will be discussed, both practices were
not uncommon prior to the GFC before the crisis showed them to be “inimical to financial
stability” (IADI 2013).
The GFC resulted in the virtual elimination of co-insurance globally, with the percentage of
deposit insurance programs having this feature dropping from 19% in 2003 to less than 3%
in 2013; in 2014, the IADI amended its core principles recommending that deposit insurers
drop co-insurance completely (IADI 2014). Co-insurance had historically been a component
of many deposit insurance systems, based on the argument that leaving depositors
responsible for a portion of any losses will increase their scrutiny of banks and reduce moral
hazard. The UK’s pre-GFC FSCS, for example, insured 100% of deposits up to GBP 2,000, but
only 90% of amounts between GBP 2,000 and GBP 35,000. This system of partial insurance
was insufficient to prevent a run of retail depositors at Northern Rock, and UK policymakers
ultimately elected to eliminate co-insurance and provide 100% coverage up to specified
limits to reassure depositors (FSA 2007). Hungary, Luxembourg, and Russia likewise
eliminated co-insurance provisions as part of their AG programs. EU Directive 2009/14/EC,
issued on March 11, 2009, eliminated the ability of member states to adopt co-insurance as
part of their deposit insurance programs. As of 2013, only Bahrain, Chile, and Libya still
included co-insurance in their deposit insurance programs (Demirgüç-Kunt, Kane, and
Laeven 2014).9 This outcome is consistent with research suggesting that deposit insurance
schemes with co-insurance are less stable, both in normal and financially turbulent times
(Chiaramonte et al. 2020).
Netting was likewise a feature included in many pre-GFC deposit insurance systems,
including in Belgium, Slovenia, and the UK. Iceland, meanwhile, added a netting requirement
as part of its GFC-era Emergency Act. The IADI criticized the UK FSCS’s practice of netting,
arguing that it obscured the amounts to which depositors would ultimately be entitled and
slowed down processing times. These issues may even have contributed to the run on
Northern Rock (IADI 2013). The UK ultimately abandoned netting in July 2009.
Some programs varied coverage limits based on the identity of depositors. Both Austria and
Romania distinguished between natural and “legal” (i.e., corporate) persons, offering the
former greater coverage (although Romania ultimately increased its coverage of legal
persons to the same level as that of natural persons). Such distinctions could also result in
exclusion from coverage altogether, as discussed in Key Design Decision No. 10, Eligible
Accounts.
The AG programs set limits on deposit insurance based on each depositor’s accounts at any
one institution; with accounts at more than one bank, a depositor could get multiples of the
9

A review of these countries’ systems indicates that all three continue to rely on co-insurance as of May 2022.
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limit insured. Brazil’s DPGE was unique among the AG programs in that it also limited the
total amount of guaranteed deposits a participating institution could accept based on its
capital levels and previous time deposit usage. As discussed in Key Design Decision No. 12,
Other Restrictions on Eligible Institutions/Accounts, it enforced these institutional limits by
imposing restrictions on any bank that exceeded them.
The specific limits that the AG programs adopted were often the product of competitive
pressures from neighboring jurisdictions or supranational requirements. In the EU, the
ECOFIN on October 7, 2008, issued non-binding guidance to member states to implement
national deposit insurance coverage levels at a minimum of EUR 50,000. Only two EU
member states met that requirement before the GFC.10 As ECOFIN acknowledged, several
member states had already determined to increase their limits to EUR 100,000. By the end
of 2008, all member states had revised their rules to meet or exceed the EUR 50,000 target.
On March 11, 2009, Directive 2009/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
established a EUR 50,000 minimum coverage level until December 31, 2010, at which time
the minimum would increase to EUR 100,000. As a directive, this measure was binding on
member states. Policymakers deemed these levels appropriate because the previously
existing EU minimum of EUR 20,000 “proved not to be adequate for a large number of
deposits” such that an increase was necessary “to maintain depositor confidence and attain
greater stability on the financial markets” (EP/EC 2009). For this reason, all the EU AG
programs involved either gradual or immediate increases to EUR 100,000 (or higher).
Both in the EU and elsewhere, the adoption of unlimited guarantees by one jurisdiction could
place significant pressure on other jurisdictions with close financial ties to follow suit to
avoid a loss of deposits. Germany’s announcement of an unlimited guarantee prompted
similar unlimited guarantees in Austria and Slovenia. Hong Kong’s unlimited guarantee led
Singapore and Malaysia to follow suit. Kuwait’s unlimited guarantee followed similar
measures in the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.
The specific funding source policymakers sought to protect may also have influenced
decisions about guarantee size in some programs. Brazil’s DGPE and the US TAGP both
targeted wholesale sources of funding and had very high limits (approximately $9 million in
the case of the former and unlimited in the case of the latter).
8. Source(s) and Size of Funding: In the event that payouts needed to be made under
an AG program, where did the money come from and how much was available?
What would happen if the primary source of funding for an AG program proved to
be insufficient to make all required payouts?
A particularly important design decision is the source and size of the funding that will be
used to make payouts. Prior to the GFC, some deposit insurance programs were backed by
ex-ante funds, accumulated from fees paid by insured institutions, while others were backed
only on an ex-post basis. International standards endorsed both types (BCBS/IADI 2009).
However, after the GFC, the IADI revised its core principles to recommend that deposit
10

France (EUR 70,000) and Italy (approximately EUR 100,000).
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insurers maintain ex-ante funds, as well as explicit emergency funding arrangements that
could include the government, the central bank, or market borrowing (IADI 2014). Only 12
ex-post systems remained in place as of 2013, prior to the IADI’s revisions, and several of
these systems converted to being ex-ante in the wake of the revisions (Demirgüç-Kunt, Kane,
and Laeven 2014).
An initial question for countries with existing ex-ante deposit insurance systems is whether
a crisis-era AG program will be incorporated into the standing deposit insurance fund
(allowing for some cross-subsidization) or whether it will have its own funding source
(protecting the standing deposit insurance fund).
An AG program that depositors see as backed by an insufficient fund will not instill
confidence in the safety of deposits.11 This does not mean, however, that AG programs
require financial backing equal to the deposits guaranteed. Even when exercised, AG
programs will generally have to pay out only a small fraction of covered amounts. Standing
ex-ante funds typically target a level based on a percentage of total estimated insured
deposits. For example, the US and Taiwan have 2% targets for their deposit insurance funds;
the EU in 2014 set a target of 0.8% for member states’ funds by 2024 (EP/EC 2014). A wellfunded ex-ante fund can make it easier to raise deposit insurance limits during a crisis. But
a well-funded ex-ante fund does not ensure a smooth process. For example, the Philippines’
DIF had a relatively high 6.1% of insured deposits before the crisis, but it took months for
the legislature to agree on the funding for its temporary insurance hike.
Ex-ante funds are also not necessarily designed to handle systemic crises. There is always
the possibility that an AG program could have to commit more than it has accumulated in its
ex-ante fund to instill confidence during a crisis, as was the case in Latvia. Disbursements
may also ultimately exceed the fund’s capacity. This is why the IADI now recommends that
countries design explicit emergency funding arrangements prior to financial crises.
Where ex-ante funds were insufficient in the GFC and other crises, countries have resorted
to a variety of ex-post funding methods. Figure 7 shows the sources of funding for the AG
programs. Special assessments levied on participating institutions were a common approach
to funding shortfalls. Such an approach had the benefit of continuing to make the institutions
themselves responsible for the costs associated with exercising the guarantee. These special
assessments are also discussed in more detail in Key Design Decision No. 11, Fees.

11 An actual fund may not be necessary in all circumstances. An AG program with a credit line from a sufficiently

creditworthy sovereign may be sufficient for the guarantee to be considered credible. As this is a very contextspecific inquiry, any prescription on when an actual fund is necessary versus when a credit line will suffice is
beyond the scope of this paper.
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Figure 7: Sources of AG Program Funding
Country

Fees

AUS
AUT
BEL
BRZ
FRA
GRC
HKG
HUN
ICE
IDN
KWT
LUX
LVA
MYS
NZL
PHL
PRT
ROM
RUS
SGP
SPA
SVN
SWI
TWN
UK
USA - TAGP
USA - TGMMF

✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓

Public
Private
borrowing borrowing
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
-

✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
-

Other
assets
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓

Source: Authors’ analysis.

Many AG programs could also borrow in the event of a shortfall, and a key question is
whether this borrowing would take place from public or private sources (or from private
sources with a public guarantee, as was the case in several programs). The UK’s FSCS
borrowed money from the Bank of England and HMT and later charged an additional levy on
deposit-taking institutions to cover the interest on these loans. Taiwan borrowed from its
banks to cover a shortfall and was prohibited from rebuilding its deposit insurance fund until
the loans were paid off. Romania required insured institutions to maintain standby lines of
credit with the FGDB, a practice criticized by the IMF as being insufficient to ensure adequate
funding and ultimately abandoned (IMF 2010a). In Portugal, participating institutions
established “irrevocable payment commitments” with the FGD. Programs such as Brazil’s
DPGE, Luxembourg’s AGDL, and Switzerland’s ESI apparently contained no mechanism for
public funding.
Some programs made use of existing sources of public money not raised from fees paid by
covered institutions. As noted in Key Design Decision No. 3, Legal Authority, the US TGMMF
and Hong Kong’s unlimited guarantee relied on existing exchange stabilization funds rather
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than new legislation. These funds became a source of funds for the programs in the event the
guarantees were exercised. Singapore simply announced that SGD 150 billion from the
reserves of the Singapore government would back its guarantee.
A few countries used two-tier funding mechanisms. For example, in Hong Kong, the standing
deposit insurance fund would cover payouts up to the previously insured HKD 100,000 cap,
and the HKMA’s Exchange Fund would cover any payouts above that cap. In the Philippines,
the PDIC used the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) to pay out the first PHP 250,000 per
depositor; the national government funded any amount in excess of PHP 250,000, and up to
PHP 500,000.
Other unique approaches to funding included Austria’s sectoral scheme, in which funds for
a payout came first from institutions in the same sector of the system as the bank that failed
before all banks more broadly had to contribute. The UK’s FSCS and Belgium’s FDP had
similar approaches based on sub-classes of institutions. Greece separated the money
generated by its fees into primary and supplementary funds. The former was held at the
Bank of Greece and were assets of the HDGF. The latter was retained in time deposits in the
name of the HDGF at the participating institutions themselves, with the supplementary funds
of a failed institution being used for payouts first before other institutions’ supplementary
funds were used. In the Philippines, the PDIC received tax breaks in the legislation that
enhanced the insurance limit. The tax breaks included a broad exemption from most taxes
that resulted in PHP 13.9 billion in revenue over five years, and a permanent exemption from
income taxes that later saved the PDIC billions annually (PDIC 2008; PDIC 2009; PDIC 2010;
PDIC 2011; PDIC 2012; PDIC 2016; PDIC 2021). The PDIC’s deposit fund was recently 7% of
insured deposits (PHP 215 billion).
An important consideration is to what extent depositor preference provisions exist in the
resolution of failed financial institutions under a jurisdiction’s laws. Such provisions typically
give depositors a priority claim on the assets of the failed institution ahead of other creditors.
This can help ensure that AG programs that make payouts to depositors are ultimately able
to recoup those funds through the liquidation of the failed institution. As discussed in more
detail in Key Design Decision No. 9, Eligible Institutions, the existence of a priority claim on
the bankruptcy estate of failed Icelandic banks due to the adoption of depositor preference
provisions by Iceland enabled the UK and the Netherlands to recover (to the detriment of
other creditors) amounts owed by Iceland to the British and Dutch governments, who paid
their depositors excluded from the protection of the TIF.
9. Eligible Institutions: What types of institutions were eligible to have their deposits
guaranteed under the AG program? Was participation mandatory or voluntary?
In determining what institutions will participate in an AG program, policymakers must
define eligibility and decide whether participation will be mandatory or voluntary. A typical
approach to the former question in our cases was to make all credit institutions licensed in
a jurisdiction eligible to participate. One consideration in determining the types of
institutions to be eligible for an AG program is whether such institutions are familiar to the
guarantee administrator or financial supervisors. As noted in Key Design Decision No. 6,
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Communication, a misunderstanding of Australia’s program contributed to New Zealand’s
extension of coverage of the CRDGS to certain nonbank financial institutions that, as the
country’s auditor-general noted, were subject to a different regulatory and supervisory
framework from banks (NZ-OAG 2011). The Treasury believed that excluding these
nonbanks would prompt their depositors to switch to insured banks. The CRDGS ultimately
had to cover nine failures, each one a nonbank financial institution.
Some programs extended protection to nonbank financial institutions other than credit
institutions. For example, Belgium’s SPF offered voluntary insurance to issuers of a
particular type of life insurance contract.12
The treatment of cross-border institutions is another key consideration in determining types
of eligible institutions. Policymakers must decide how to treat both foreign banks doing
business locally via branches and domestic banks doing business abroad via branches. In
Europe, EU Directive 94/19/EC established rules for the treatment of cross-border
institutions under deposit guarantee schemes. The directive provided that member states
should cover branches of their institutions that operate in other member states. If such other
member states offer deposit insurance coverage that is more expansive than coverage in the
home member state, the host member states must allow foreign branches to voluntarily join
programs to supplement the coverage provided by the branches’ home countries. In the
absence of such requirements, the EU argued that the existence of differing deposit insurance
regimes across member states would result in an uneven playing field between institutions
authorized in a jurisdiction and branches from other member states (EP/EC 1994).
The coverage of foreign branches became a particularly problematic issue for Iceland’s TIF.
Iceland limited its full guarantee to “domestic commercial and savings banks and their
branches in Iceland” without specifying its approach to deposits held in the foreign branches
of Icelandic banks (Icelandic Prime Minister’s Office 2008). This focus on domestic
depositors reflected the reality that Iceland lacked the economic wherewithal to make good
on all guaranteed deposits. The Icelandic government’s seeming exclusion of foreign
branches of Icelandic banks infuriated the British and Dutch governments and led to a fouryear legal battle known as the “Icesave dispute,” after one of these banks’ deposit products.
After covering losses for Icesave’s retail depositors, the British and Dutch governments
sought reimbursement by filing a lawsuit through the Court of the European Free Trade
Association (EFTA Court). The plaintiffs alleged that the Icelandic government’s exclusion of
foreign deposits was discriminatory by nationality and, therefore, in violation of EU Directive
94/19/EC. Iceland rejected claims of discrimination, arguing that the EU directive did not
address instances of large bank failure, and it was not clear that currency-convertible foreign
deposits were at an economic disadvantage compared to deposits which could be paid only
in Icelandic krona. On January 28, 2013, the EFTA Court ruled that the Icelandic authorities
did not have to compensate the Icesave depositors, and British and Dutch governments had
priority claim on proceeds from the bankruptcy estate of the failed Icelandic parent
company. The assets of the estate (which had to be converted into pounds sterling or euros)
Belgian authorities extended coverage to these life insurance products as part of an agreement to secure
insurance company support for the stabilization of Dexia.
12
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were ultimately sufficient to allow for the reimbursement of the British and Dutch, with the
last payment being made on January 11, 2016 (Jónsson and Sigurgeirsson 2016).
Figure 8 identifies the various approaches to the “mandatory versus voluntary” question and
which approach the AG programs adopted. As indicated, mandatory participation was
common. Among voluntary AG programs, there were some that required participants to opt
in and others in which potential participants were automatically enrolled with the ability to
opt-out. In the US TAGP, policymakers used automatic enrollment with a non-reversible optout window to encourage widespread participation. Even institutions without a current need
for the program might decide to remain enrolled based on uncertainty about whether they
would need it in the future (at which point they would be unable to access it if they had
previously opted out).
Before the GFC, the IADI in its core principles recommended compulsory membership for all
financial institutions accepting deposits from individual depositors and small-business
depositors—that is, those depositors most in need of protection. After the GFC, the IADI
recommended compulsory membership for all banks, without qualification (BCBS/IADI
2009; IADI 2014). However, these recommendations have not included advice for
policymakers who are enhancing their deposit insurance programs during crises.
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Figure 8: Mandatory vs. Voluntary AG Programs
Country
Mandatory Opt-out Opt-in
AUS
✓
AUT
✓
BEL
✓
BRZ
✓
FRA
✓
GRC
✓
HKG
✓
HUN
✓
ICE
✓
IDN
✓
KWT
✓
LUX
✓
LVA
✓
MYS
✓
NZL
✓
PHL
✓
PRT
✓
ROM
✓
RUS
✓
SGP
✓
SPA
✓
SVN
✓
SWI
✓
TWN
✓
UK
✓
USA - TAGP
✓
USA - TGMMF
✓
Source: Authors’ analysis.

10. Eligible Accounts: What types of accounts were eligible to be guaranteed under
the AG program?
In addition to eligible institutions, policymakers must also determine what accounts can
participate in AG programs. Figure 9 shows the types of accounts typically covered by AG
programs and which types were included in which programs. Most of the programs we
reviewed guaranteed bank deposits. Exceptions included the TGMMF in the US, which
guaranteed MMF investors, and Belgium’s program, which covered investment accounts and
a particular type of life insurance product used as savings vehicles by the same depositors
who used more traditional products offered by commercial banks. The currencies in which
accounts were denominated could also play a role, with a small number of the programs
limiting coverage to specified currencies. France, for example, excluded currencies from nonEU member states.
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Figure 9: Eligible Account Types
Country Code

Demand
deposit

AUS
✓
AUT
✓
BEL
✓
BRZ
FRA
✓
GRC
✓
HKG
✓
HUN
✓
ICE
✓
IDN
✓
KWT
✓
LUX
✓
LVA
✓
MYS
✓
NZL
✓
PHL
✓
PRT
✓
ROM
✓
RUS
✓
SGP
✓
SPA
✓
SVN
✓
SWI
✓
TWN
✓
UK
✓
USA - TAGP
✓
USA - TGMMF
Source: Authors’ analysis.

Term
deposit

Interbank
deposit

✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
-

✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
-

Non-deposit or
deposit-like
instrument
unknown
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓

The nature of the accountholder could also determine eligibility. For example, EU Directive
94/19/EC, whose rules set boundaries on member state programs, excluded accounts held
by financial institutions, government and administrative authorities, collective investment
undertakings, pension funds, and large companies. Indonesia’s IDIC deemed deposits
ineligible for payout if the depositor was considered to have benefited “in an unusual
manner” (for example, by taking advantage of interest rates that exceeded IDIC’s published
rates) or contributed in any way to the bank’s failure (for example, was a debtor who held a
nonperforming loan) (IDIC 2009).
Several AG programs involved expanding coverage to types of accounts previously excluded
from existing deposit insurance systems. During the GFC, Taiwan’s CDIC elected to include
multiple new account types including negotiable certificates of deposit, government
deposits, central bank deposits, and the deposits of various types of banking institutions. As
noted in Key Design Decision No. 1, Purpose, Brazil responded to runs at small- and mediumsized banks by developing the DGPE to guarantee time deposits. The DPGE’s time deposit
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guarantee targeted institutional investors by expanding coverage to BRL 20 million per
depositor, compared with the BRL 70 thousand coverage for regular deposits. In the US, the
TAGP initially covered only non-interest-bearing accounts before institutional and depositor
feedback persuaded policymakers to expand coverage to low-interest accounts as well in
order to avoid market distortions. Hong Kong‘s full deposit guarantee excluded structured
deposits, which were derivatives-based financial products that performed like deposits;
deposits that were pledged, charged, or secured as collateral; and deposits that were subject
to a contractual right of set-off. Malaysia’s guarantee covered principal-guaranteed
structured deposits, a continuation of pre-crisis coverage.
One interesting design feature of the TGMMF in the US was the use of account eligibility rules
to address the risk that an AG program could trigger runs elsewhere in the system.
Specifically, US authorities were concerned that an unlimited guarantee on MMFs would
cause bank depositors to shift all balances above the deposit insurance limit to the fully
guaranteed funds. To avoid this run on the banking system, authorities restricted TGMMF
eligibility to balances in place prior to the program’s announcement. Given that amounts
transferred into MMFs after the program’s announcement would not be subject to the
guarantee, there was no incentive for bank depositors to shift balances there.
11. Fees: What fees, if any, did institutions have to pay as part of the AG program?
Were such fees flat or risk-based? Could special fees be imposed if necessary to
fund payouts?
As noted in Key Design Decision No. 8, Source(s) and Size of Funding, most of the AG
programs funded themselves at least partially through fees paid by covered financial
institutions. Figure 10 shows how each AG program approached the fee question. Fee
structures could be flat or risk-based (that is, they could vary based on the health of each
institution). Programs could impose fees on an ex-ante basis, to build funds that insurers
could use in the event of failure, or ex-post, imposed only after a failure. Some programs
shifted their approach to fees over time, with one common pattern being an initial period of
flat-rate fees followed by risk-based fees once the practical challenges associated with the
latter had been resolved. In Belgium, the shift to risk-based fees came about by court order
following litigation by a program participant who challenged the legality of flat fees under
Belgian law. While bank-debt guarantee programs often made use of market-based metrics
such as credit default swap spreads and credit ratings to determine risk-based fees, AG
programs tended to use supervisory ratings (in Hong Kong, for example) or balance-sheet
measures, such as capital and liquidity ratios. In Greece, for example, the HGDF and Bank of
Greece adopted a three-tier classification system using supervisory evaluation criteria
including capital levels, liquidity levels, and governance practices, with fees varying by tier.
One country that used a more market-based fee approach was New Zealand, where firms
rated lower than BB paid a 300 basis-point fee that was partially waived if they managed to
get their rating raised to BB or higher.
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Figure 10: AG Program Fees
Timing of fees
Country Code

Risk weights

Ex ante Ex post Flat

Riskbased

Institutional weights
Size of
Type of
institution institution

AUS

-

✓*

-

-

-

-

AUT

-

✓*

-

-

✓

-

BEL

✓

✓*

✓

✓

-

✓

BRZ

✓

✓

✓

-

✓

-

FRA

✓

✓

-

✓

-

-

GRC

✓

-

-

✓

✓

-

HKG

✓

-

-

✓

-

-

HUN

✓

✓*

✓

-

-

-

ICE

-

-

-

-

-

-

IDN

✓

-

-

-

✓

-

KWT

-

-

-

-

-

-

LUX

-

✓*

-

-

✓

-

LVA

✓

✓*

✓

-

-

-

MYS

✓

-

-

-

✓

✓

NZL

✓

-

-

✓

✓

✓

PHL

✓

-

-

-

✓

-

PRT

✓

-

-

✓

-

-

ROM

✓

✓*

✓

-

-

-

RUS

✓

-

✓

-

-

-

SGP

-

-

-

-

-

-

SPA

✓

-

✓

-

-

-

SVN

-

✓

-

-

✓

-

SWI

-

✓*

✓

-

✓

-

TWN

✓

-

✓

✓

✓

✓

UK

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

USA - TAGP

✓

-

✓

✓

-

-

USA - TGMMF

✓

-

-

✓

-

-

* Indicates the presence of a cap on ex-post fees.
Source: Authors’ analysis.

In determining the level of fees to be charged for participation in an AG program, there is a
tension between the appropriate fee given the risk to guarantor and the desire to avoid
charging banks too much at a time when they are already strained. Responding to this latter
concern, Russia lowered the fees associated with its DIA during the GFC. In the newly created
TGMMF in the US, policymakers determined fee levels from the “bottom up” by considering
the profit margin typical for the industry and selecting a fee rate that was meaningful, but
not so high as to discourage widespread participation. This concern about avoiding excessive

68

Journal of Financial Crises

Vol. 4 Iss. 2

burden on institutions under crisis conditions was not a universal pattern, however, and
countries including Hungary and Romania raised their fees during the GFC.
The programs also involved other approaches to limiting the burden on banks. Brazil’s
revised DPGE sought to reduce fees by accepting collateral from participating banks. Before
the GFC, some countries also preferred ex-post fees to reduce the burden on participating
institutions given that no payments are necessary unless failures actually occur. As noted in
Key Design Decision No. 13, Process for Exercising Guarantees, such arrangements can raise
concerns about whether sufficient fees can be collected quickly enough to enable prompt
payouts. An additional consideration is that in an ex-post scheme, failed institutions never
contribute to the payouts (IADI 2012). International authorities criticized ex-post schemes
after the GFC. For example, in response to criticism from the IMF and from its own
authorities, Luxembourg ultimately replaced its ex-post fee system with an ex-ante approach
following the GFC (IMF 2009b; 2010b). As noted in Key Design Decision No. 8, Source(s) and
Size of Funding, in 2014 the IADI revised its core principles to recommend that deposit
insurers maintain ex-ante funds, as well as explicit emergency funding arrangements that
could include the government, the central bank, or market borrowing (IADI 2014).
Similar to ex-post fees are the special assessments that many programs planned to impose
in the event that accumulated upfront fees were insufficient to cover required payouts. With
any payment made after a bank failure, a concern from the paying institutions’ perspective
is that they will have contingent liabilities of an unknown amount tied to the activities of
other institutions. Charging banks additional fees during a banking crisis is also procyclical—
it interferes with the government’s objectives of strengthening banks and promoting
lending. To address these concerns, ex-post fees and special assessments were often capped.
Example approaches to setting these caps include using a multiple of prior years’ fees
(Greece), using a percentage of shareholder equity (Luxembourg), using a percentage of riskweighted assets (Austria), and setting a flat overall limit (Switzerland).
12. Other Restrictions on Eligible Institutions or Accounts: Were there other
requirements that eligible institutions or account holders had to adhere to while
participating in the AG program?
Crisis interventions often require the institutions receiving assistance to agree to certain
restrictions as a condition for participation. Typically, these restrictions seek to address
moral-hazard concerns or to otherwise make the interventions more politically palatable.
Bank-debt guarantee programs, which were frequently combined with AG programs, often
had restrictions on balance-sheet growth, dividend payments, and executive compensation
(McNamara et al. 2020). Key Design Decision No. 2, Part of a Package, explores this further.
However, these types of restrictions were not a significant feature of the AG programs,
perhaps because AG programs were intended to be more broad-based or because many were
mandatory. Instead, policymakers often cited heightened supervision as a development that
would accompany AG programs to address concerns such as moral hazard.
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A few AG programs did not permit insured institutions to mention the protection in their
advertising. In Belgium, SPF members who either failed to fulfill obligations to the SPF or
transgressed the ban on advertising faced the loss of deposit insurance coverage.
Those AG programs that did have other restrictions typically included design features that
those restrictions were intended to address. Brazil’s DPGE included a cap on the amount of
guaranteed deposits that an institution could accept. To help enforce this cap, Brazilian
authorities could impose operational limits on any institution that exceeded it. Given that
Switzerland’s ESI charged no upfront fees and instead imposed assessments in the event of
a bank failure, policymakers required participating institutions to both maintain a certain
level of domestic assets and to hold a certain level of liquid assets relative to their maximum
assessment level.
13. Process for Exercising Guarantees: What would trigger a payout under the AG
program? How quickly would such a payout be made?
Depositors want to know that if their bank fails, they will receive their funds quickly. As
Directive 2009/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council noted with respect to
the lengthy payout process that existed in many EU member states heading into the GFC,
“[t]he payout delay of three months currently provided for, which can be extended to nine
months, runs counter to the need to maintain depositor confidence and does not meet their
needs” (EP/EC 2009).
An important threshold question is what triggers the payout process under an AG program.
Limiting the trigger to a bankruptcy filing may be too narrow, because institutions could be
in significant distress long before a formal filing is made depending on the jurisdiction. Many
of the AG programs allow for an exercise of the guarantee based on other conditions, such as
a failure to pay back deposits when requested or a determination by supervisors that an
institution would be unable to pay back deposits. Australia’s FCS had a particularly rigid
process for exercising its guarantee, requiring the approval both of the Australian treasurer
and of a court. The IMF criticized this process as creating uncertainty about whether the
guarantee would be exercised and increasing the risk of bank runs (IMF 2012).
Figure 11 illustrates how long payouts could take under AG programs once the guarantee
has been exercised. Although an exact comparison between programs can be difficult given
the trigger issue, Figure 11 provides some indication of how long depositors may have had
to wait for their funds. Many AG programs in the EU shortened their payout periods in
response to Directive 2009/14/EC’s requirement that payouts occur within 20 working
days. Several of AG programs also offered prompt payment of small amounts, with the
remainder of insured funds payable over a longer period. The Philippines, for example, in
2010 created a waiver system pursuant to which accounts up to PHP 5,000 could be paid out
almost immediately, while funds up to the PHP 500,000 limit could take up to six months.
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Figure 11: Maximum Payout Periods (Including Extensions)
Maximum payout time
Country
Without extension
With extension
AUS
unknown
unknown
AUT
3 months*
unknown*
BEL
20 days*
30 days*
BRZ
unknown
unknown
FRA
2 months*
6 months*
GRC
20 days*
30 days*
HKG
unknown
unknown
HUN
20 days*
30 days*
ICE
unknown
unknown
IDN
up to 90 days
up to 90 days
KWT
unknown
unknown
LUX
3 months*
1 year*
LVA
3 months*
9 months*
MYS
as soon as possible
3 months
NZL
unknown
unknown
PHL
6 months*
6 months*
PRT
7 days*
3 months*
ROM
3 months*
9 months*
RUS
7 to 14 days
unknown
SGP
unknown
unknown
SPA
3 months*
1 year*
SVN
20 days*
30 days*
SWI
3 months
unknown
TWN
unknown
unknown
UK
unknown*
unknown*
USA - TAGP as soon as possible
unknown
USA - TGMMF 30 days
unknown
*Indicates that the payout timeframe was shortened or altered during
the crisis. Timeframe shown is post-alteration.
Source: Authors’ analysis.

Several practical considerations can influence the ability of an AG program to successfully
execute timely payouts. As further discussed in Key Design Decision No. 11, Fees, some AG
programs funded themselves by imposing ex-post fees after a bank failure had already
occurred. One concern with such an approach is that it could delay the availability of funds
with which to make depositor payouts.
Another issue is a lack of experience or capacity for exercising guarantees, particularly with
programs that were new or otherwise had no history of making payouts. On this front,
several of the AG programs adopted approaches intended to address this limitation. Multiple
countries used agent banks to help with the payout process (often with IMF encouragement),
although the ECB criticized the similar use of agent banks by Latvia based on the concern
that such agent banks could be seen as having an implicit government guarantee (ECB 2009).
Romania also used payout test exercises to prepare for the possibility of needing to exercise
its guarantee.
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Design decisions and practical difficulties ended up disrupting payout processes in certain
AG programs. New Zealand’s CRDGS was a new program introduced in a country without a
history of deposit insurance. New Zealand’s auditor-general criticized the plan’s lack of
preparedness for depositor payouts. Ultimately, after several institutions failed, the plan had
to pay out all depositors regardless of eligibility because of the administrative difficulties of
determining eligibility and concerns about the interest that would accrue as payments were
processed (NZ-OAG 2011). In Portugal, meanwhile, lawsuits significantly delayed guarantee
payments.
The TGMMF in the US included an interesting design feature intended to ensure that the
guarantee was exercised only as a last resort. Historically, MMFs in the United States that
suffered losses had received assistance from the financial institutions sponsoring them.
Sponsors provided this assistance to avoid the reputational risk associated with losing
investors’ funds. So as not to discourage continued sponsor support for troubled MMFs, the
TGMMF required any fund for which the guarantee was exercised to liquidate. Given that this
liquidation would also create reputational consequences for the sponsoring institutions,
they remained incentivized to offer support if possible.
14. Duration: How long was the AG program intended to last when announced? Did it
ultimately end as originally scheduled?
The AG programs were introduced in response to crisis conditions, raising the question of if,
when, and under what conditions the programs would end. Several of the programs were
either adopted as permanent changes or with an open-ended duration. In the EU, for
example, the GFC prompted a directive requiring member states to increase deposit
insurance coverage to a minimum of EUR 100,000, but this increase was intended to be a
permanent change. Figure 12 indicates both the originally intended and actual durations of
the AG programs. In some cases, deposit insurers ultimately lowered deposit caps that they
had temporarily increased during the crisis. Singapore, Malaysia, and Hong Kong
coordinated their transition from unlimited guarantees to new deposit limits that were
higher than they had before the GFC. In other cases, countries replaced their crisis-era AG
programs with permanent programs with ex-ante funding. New Zealand, for example, is
developing a standing program that is expected to launch in 2023.
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Figure 12: Intended and Actual Durations
Date of
announcement
AUS
10/12/2008
AUT
10/8/2008
BEL
10/10/2008
BRZ
3/26/2009
FRA
9/29/2010
GRC
10/8/2008
HKG
10/14/2008
HUN
10/8/2008
ICE
10/6/2008
IDN
10/13/2008
KWT
10/26/2008
LUX
10/17/2008
LVA
10/16/2008
MYS
10/16/2008
NZL
10/12/2008
PHL
10/9/2008
PRT
11/3/2008
ROM
10/12/2008
RUS
10/13/2008
SGP
10/16/2008
SPA
10/10/2008
SVN
10/8/2008
SWI
11/5/2008
TWN
10/7/2008
UK
10/3/2008
USA - TAGP 10/14/2008
USA - TGMMF 9/19/2008
Source: Authors’ analysis.
Country

Date of
authorization
10/17/2008
10/26/2008
11/17/2008
3/26/2009
9/29/2010
11/7/2008
10/14/2008
10/14/2008
10/6/2008
10/13/2008
11/3/2008
12/19/2008
10/16/2008
10/16/2008
10/12/2008
4/29/2009
11/3/2008
10/14/2008
10/13/2008
10/16/2008
10/10/2008
11/11/2008
12/19/2008
10/7/2008
10/2/2008
10/13/2008
9/19/2008

Date of
operation
11/28/2008
10/1/2008
10/7/2008
4/1/2009
9/29/2010
11/8/2008
10/14/2008
10/15/2008
10/6/2008
10/13/2008
11/3/2008
1/1/2009
10/18/2008
10/16/2008
10/12/2008
6/1/2009
12/12/2008
10/15/2008
10/13/2008
10/16/2008
10/10/2008
11/20/2008
12/20/2008
10/7/2008
10/7/2008
10/14/2008
9/29/2008

Planned
end date
permanent
12/31/2009
permanent
1/1/2016
permanent
12/31/2011
12/31/2010
unknown
unknown
permanent
unknown
permanent
permanent
12/31/2010
10/12/2010
permanent
12/31/2011
permanent
permanent
12/31/2010
permanent
12/31/2010
12/31/2010
12/31/2009
permanent
12/31/2009
12/29/2008

True end
date
permanent
12/31/2009
permanent
permanent
permanent
permanent
12/31/2010
unknown
9/6/2016
permanent
unknown
permanent
permanent
12/31/2010
12/31/2011
permanent
permanent
permanent
permanent
12/31/2010
permanent
12/31/2010
permanent
12/31/2010
permanent
12/31/2010
9/18/2009

The persistence of certain AG programs beyond crisis times has resulted in criticism.
Kuwait’s unlimited guarantee, adopted in October 2008 in response to the GFC, remained in
place as of March 2022. While acknowledging the crisis-time utility of the unlimited
guarantee, post-crisis the IMF called for Kuwait to replace it with a capped amount due to
moral hazard and reduced market discipline (IMF 2019).

Conclusion
This paper surveys 14 Key Design Decisions for 27 AG programs. A comparison of these
programs highlights several important themes to be considered by policymakers in
developing any AG program.
Perhaps even more so than other crisis interventions, AG programs have the potential
to affect other parts of the financial system and other jurisdictions. The existence of
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guarantees can cause a flight of funds from other parts of the financial system and other
jurisdictions that lack similar guarantees. The AG programs were generally successful in
retaining and attracting deposits. Preliminarily assessing the performance of deposit
insurance schemes during the GFC, Demirgüç-Kunt, Kane, and Laeven concluded that such
schemes “by and large…fulfilled [their] foremost purpose of preventing open runs on bank
deposits” (Demirgüç-Kunt, Kane, and Laeven 2015).13 Sometimes a program’s
announcement alone appears to have had an impact, as was the case in Taiwan (Basri and
Rahardja 2010; Ko 2008). But it is important to understand where the new deposits came
from and whether the guarantee in question stabilized one part of the system or one
jurisdiction at the expense of another. International cooperation, such as was seen in the EU
(although not without tensions) and with the Tripartite Working Group in Hong Kong,
Malaysia, and Singapore, can help alleviate these concerns. Design features such as the
TGMMF’s “existing balances only” approach to account eligibility would also help ensure that
the introduction of an AG program does not precipitate a run somewhere else.
Policymakers can address the moral hazard concerns associated with AG programs
through heightened supervision, eliminating a potential obstacle to the adoption of
such programs in response to the acute phase of crises. Critics of AG programs continue
to raise concerns about the possibility that such programs will encourage greater risk taking
by financial institutions freed from the market discipline that they believe non-guaranteed
depositors can provide. Analysts of Indonesia’s IDIC found some evidence of a material
increase in bank risk-taking following a significant increase in the deposit insurance system’s
coverage limit (Saheruddin 2017). Unlimited guarantees face particular criticism from a
moral hazard perspective (Anginer and Demirgüç-Kunt 2018). However, moral hazard
should not be a primary concern during the acute phase of crises, when institutions are
focused on survival and depositor runs are an inefficient and potentially disastrous way of
promoting market discipline. As crises shift to the chronic phase, heightened supervision of
institutions covered by expanded guarantees is a means for addressing the risk that such
institutions will engage in riskier lending as a result.
For an AG program to be effective, depositors must be confident that they will have
access to all of their funds in a timely fashion. The credibility of the guarantor and the
efficiency of the payout process are crucial factors in determining the success of an AG
program. Choices made across multiple Key Design Decisions can influence these outcomes.
An AG program’s approach to No. 8, Source(s) and Size of Funding, and No. 11, Fees, may
determine whether the guarantee is credible. The revised IADI guidance post-GFC is leading
most deposit insurers to build ex-ante funds, eschewing ex-post funding (although as noted,
an actual fund may not be necessary in all circumstances, with a credit line from a
creditworthy sovereign potentially sufficient for a guarantee to be considered credible). It is
also leading insurers to eliminate co-insurance. As a result, it is more likely that depositors
will get 100% of their guaranteed balances. Under No. 13, Process for Exercising Guarantees,

13 Such success was not universal. In Indonesia, for example, there were continued “flights to quality” as
depositors moved their funds to large private banks and state banks of any size despite the existence of a
guarantee (Basri and Rahardja 2010).
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sufficiently flexible guarantee triggers and condensed payout windows help ensure that
depositors don’t have to wait too long for access to their funds.
Policymakers should design standing AG programs with an eye toward how they will
function in crises. Most countries now have or are establishing standing deposit insurance.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to prescribe the coverage levels necessary for such
insurance to be effective in non-crisis conditions. What seems clear from the programs,
however, is that non-crisis coverage levels may prove to be insufficient during the acute
phase of a crisis. This illustrates that countries should have in place mechanisms for easily
expanding that insurance during a crisis without the need for new legislation. The IADI has
said that the expansion of insurance during a crisis is justifiable, without providing guidance
on how to prepare for it. Malaysia, for example, provided GFC-era legislation permanently
giving itself the ability to expand its insurance upon consultation among the deposit
insurance authority, the central bank, and the minister of finance.
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Glossary
AG: Account guarantee
AGDL: Association Pour la Garantie des Dépôts Luxembourg (Luxembourg)
BoE: Bank of England (UK)
CDIC: Central Deposit Insurance Corporation (Taiwan)
CRDGS: Crown Retail Deposit Guarantee Scheme (New Zealand)
DIF: Deposit Insurance Fund (Philippines)
DPGE: Time Deposits with Special Guarantee (Brazil)
ECB: European Central Bank
ECOFIN: European Union Council on Economic and Financial Affairs
EFTA Court: Court of the European Free Trade Association
ESI: Swiss Banks’ and Securities Dealers’ Depositor Protection Association (Switzerland)
EU: European Union
FCS: Financial Claims Scheme (Australia)
FDP: Protection Fund for Deposits and Financial Instruments (Belgium)
FGD: Fondos de Garantía de Depósitos (Spain)
FGDB: Fondul de Garantare a Depozitelor Bancare (Romania)
FMA: Financial Market Authority (Austria)
FSCS: Financial Services Compensation Scheme (UK)
GFC: Global Financial Crisis
HMT: Her Majesty’s Treasury (UK)
IADI: International Association of Deposit Insurers
IMF: International Monetary Fund
MMF: Money market fund
PDIC: Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (Philippines)
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SPF: Special Protection Fund for Deposits and Life Insurance (Belgium)
TGMMF: Temporary Guarantee Program for Money Market Funds (US)
TLGP: Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program (US)
TIF: Tryggingarsjóður innstæðueigenda og fjárfesta (Iceland)
TAGP: Transaction Account Guarantee Program (US)
WB: World Bank
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